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Abstract• A data base is compromised if a user can determine the data 
elements associated with keys which he did not know previously. If it 
is possible, compromise can be achieved by posing a finite set of queries 
over sets of data elements and employing initial information to solve the 
resulting system of equations. Assuming the allowable queries are linear, 
that is, weighted sums of data elements, we show how comprise can be 
achieved and we characterize the maximal initial information permitted 
of a user in a secure system. When compromise is possible, the initial 
information and the number of queries required to achieve it is surprisingly 
small. 
Work reported herein was supported in part by NSF Grant MCS75-21100 
and by Purdue David Ross Grant 7994-56-13985. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Statistical data bases contain sensitive information about individuals. 
Their purpose is to provide summary statistics about groups of people, 
while permitting only authorized access to the records of any one indivi-
dual. But this objective is difficult to meet, for seemingly innocuous 
summaries contain vestiges of the original data. By correlating enough 
summaries, an intruder may infer confidential data. We understand much 
more about controlling access to individual records than we do about con-
trolling inference. 
A query is a function applied to a given subset of the records in 
the data base; this subset is called the query set. Given the form of 
allowable queries and an assumption about the information known initially 
by enquirers, we wish to specify whether or not the data base is secure. 
A proof that a data base can be compromised amounts to exhibiting a 
method for constructing a sequence of queries whose responses imply 
the value associated with a given, arbitrary key. A proof that a data 
base is secure is much more difficult, for it requires us to demonstrate 
that no such sequence exists. 
Inference has long been a concern of census statisticians, who have 
developed sophisticated methods for choosing samples for analysis. The 
principle is to apply queries against a random subfile; deducing an ele-
ment of the subfile is of little help because the relation between the sub-
file and the full population is unknown. Unfortunately, many contemporary 
applications center on small or medium data bases where random sampling 
cannot be used. 
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Much existing literature on inference applies to counting queries, 
which return the number of individuals satisfying given characteristics 
-- e.g., "Female astronomers over 40 years of age." [Haq74, Haq75, 
HoM70, Sch75]. These studies have shown that the danger of compromise 
is greatest when the system responds for small query sets. Some 
protection is afforded when the system refuses answers for small counts 
[Chi77, FeP74, Sch76]. However, this protection is far from complete 
[DDS77, Scw77]. 
Another class of easily compromised queries is selection queries. 
Such a query returns a specific value from the query set, such as the 
largest, the smallest, or the median. These queries are easily compromised 
even if the data base system somehow enforces a restriction that no two 
query sets overlap by more than one record [Dav76, DJL76, Rei77, DDL76]. 
The subject of this paper is the class of linear queries. Each of 
these queries returns a weighted sum of elements in the query set. Our 
results extend those of Dobkin, Jones, and Lipton [DJL76], whose queries 
computed simple (unweighted) sums of elements in the query sets. One 
aspect of the results is striking: a user who knows as little as the value 
associated with a single key can often achieve a full compromise of the 
entire data base -- with a query sequence whose length is not much longer 
than the number of stored data elements. 
As a running example, we will use the data base displayed in Table 1, 
referred to hereafter as the "runner's data base." It contains facts about 
foot racers. Users of the data base might be allowed to discover general 
properties such as average running paces; however, they are not supposed 
to be able to deduce facts about individual runners from these queries. 
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1 Smith 68 380 680 22 260 3183 1948 
2 Jones 61 405 530 18 287 3520 1950 
3 Burns 56 440 460 20 316 3818 1940 
4 Cohen 48 485 410 18 368 4447 1930 
5 Cook 49 470 375 20 360 4394 1962 
6 Bloom 54 440 430 20 328 3980 1948 
7 King 53 440 405 20 334 4072 1943 
8 Frank 72 370 705 23 251 2997 1947 
"Max VOX" is the maximum volume of oxygen processable 
in milliliters per kilogram body weight per minute. 
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MODEL OF A DATA BASE 
A statistical data base contains a set of records about individuals. 
Each record contains an identifier field, one or more category fields, and 
one or more data fields. Some data fields may also be category fields. 
The identifier field contains a unique identifier for the record. 
Reading and writing in single records via identifiers is controlled by 
an access mechanism. A user presents the symbolic name of a record, the 
system looks up the identifier corresponding to that name and checks 
authorization. 
A data element is a value stored in a given data field of a given 
record. The size of the data base is the total number, N, of data elements 
in it. In a partitioned data base, the data elements are divided into 
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive classes. The jth class, 
denoted Y., contains N. data elements, and N = E. N.. The columns of 
J J 3 1 
the runner's data base are examples of classes. A key p = (i,j) identifies 
a data element, which is denoted either x or x... P iJ 
A query set is a collection of data elements identified by a list 
of keys or by a characteristic formula. (A characteristic formula is 
a logical formula which is matched against the values in category fields.) 
A queTy computes some value for the query set. To prevent trivial compromises 
a query program will not respond if the query set contains fewer than k 
data elements, where k > 2 is a parameter of the system. 
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EXAMPLE. The runner's data base contains 8 Tecords and 7 data 
fields, a total of N =56 data elements. The keys are pairs 
(i,j) where i is a row index and j is a column index. The user 
would specify symbolic name, pairs which would be translated to 
keys internally; for example, (Smith, Max VOX) translates to 
(1,1) and (Cohen, Year of Birth) to (4,7). The corresponding 
data elements are x^j = 68 and x ^ = 1930. A possible key-
specified query is "What is the average train-pace for (Smith, 
Jones, Frank)?" The same query expressed with a characteristic 
formula is "What is the average train-pace among Tunners whose 
Max VOX is greater than 60?" 
This paper analyzes threats to statistical data base security for 
key-specified query sets. Security for characteristic-specified query 
sets is treated in other papers [DDS77, Scw77]. A summary of important 
results for both types of query sets is given in [Den78]. 
Compromising the Data Base 
A user has identified a key (i,j) as soon as he knows the value of 
its data element x^. A user usually has some initial information about 
the data base: he may know operational details of some query programs, or 
the values of some data elements. Relative to an assumption about initial 
information, a data base is insecure if it is possible to identify keys 
not known initially. Identifying previously unknown keys is a compromise, 
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and identifying all the keys is a full compromise. If the data base is 
insecure there will exist a finite sequence of queries query 
sets Xj,...,Xm, and responses f°r which it is possible to solve 
the system of equations 
V 1 = w 
v2 = q2CX2) 
CD ... 
Vra Sn^nP 
for some unknown key. 
We are interested in characterizing the amount of initial information 
that can be tolerated in a secure system, and the amount of work of 
compromise an insecure system. 
EXAMPLE. A regression analysis has yielded a formula to predict 
the time a runner will take to run a marathon [FoD75]: 
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(2) q(i) = J a. x.. + 319 seconds. 
j=l 3 
Suppose that this query is available in the data base and that the 
user knows the coefficients â  (e.g.> from reading the article). 
If that user also knows any three of x.1} x.-, x.„, and x.., he can ' ll i2 I 3 i4 
use the system's response to qCi) to solve Equation 2 for the fourth. 
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Linear Queries 
To pose a query, a user specifies a list of distinct keys 
the system determines the query set {x ,...,x ) and computes the value 
P1 pk 
of the query function for it. To keep the notation simple, we will show 
the query set as argument to the query, rather than the list of keys. 
Thus q(Zj,...denotes a query over a list of distinct keys that specify 
the data elements z ^ , . • . A linear query has the form 
k (3) q(z,,...,zO = I a. z. 
1 * j = l 3 J 
for some fixed k > 2 and fixed "query weights" a^. This form of query 
has been called a "weighted sum query" [SDD77]. 
The assumption that the query set size is fixed at k elements for 
all queries is a degenerate case of the restriction that each query 
set contains at least k elements. When query set size can vary, as 
for characteristic-specified queries, compromise can be even simpler 
[DDS77]. Our objective here is to show how easy compromise can be even 
when the intruder cannot exploit variation in query set size. 
A sum query is a linear query with unit weights (all a.. = 1). 
Such queries are used to compute averages. Dobkin, Jones, and Lipton 
[DJL76] developed upper and lower bounds on the number of sum queries 
sufficient to compromise under the restriction that no two query sets 
can overlap by more than r elements. For N data elements with r = 1 
and no initial information, compromise is possible within 2k-1 queries 
2 2 if N >_^ = k -k+1; however, compromise is impossible when N < Nj = (k +k)/2. 
Whether or not compromise is possible when N^ <_ N < ̂  was not resolved. 
Davida et al tightened these bounds [Dav76]. 
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Kam and Ullman studied the security of a class of key-matching sum 
queries [KaU76]. Each key is a bit-string of b bits, and there are 
data elements. To make a query, the user specifies the values of some 
set of a bits, where a _< b; the query program returns the sum of the 
data elements whose keys match in the given a positions. The data base 
is secure whenever users have no initial information, if a < b, and if the 
ranges of values of the data elements are unknown. Otherwise compromise 
may be possible. 
A partitioned query is a linear query in a partitioned data base with 
the restriction that the jth key specifies a data element from the jth 
class; there are k classes in all. Equation 2 is an example with four 
classes. 
Our results for linear queries and partitioned queries are outlined 
in the next sections. The proofs are given in the appendices. 
3 SECURITY OF LINEAR QUERIES 
We consider queries of the form of Equation 3 applied to a data base 
of N elements. All queries use the same value of k and the same weights a^. 
We observe first that, knowing one weight a^ and one data element x, 
we can compromise the entire data base. Let q^ and q^ be the responses 
to. the two queries 
= 1>•••» zjJx,Zj,...,z^) 
q2 = q(z1,...,z._1,y,z.+1>...,zk) 
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which differ only in their use of data elements x and y in the jth position. 
Equation 3 shows that 
(4) (qrq2) = a.Cx-y), 
which can be solved for y. Now the entire data base is vulnerable: we 
pose q^ once and a new q^ for each of the N-l unknown data elements, 
effecting a full compromise with N queries and N-l applications of 
Equation 4. As soon as two data elements, x and y, are known, we can 
also use Equation 4 to solve for any unknown weight. 
EXAMPLE. Suppose that the runner's data base implements the query 
q(z1,z2,z3) = ,2z1 + -5z2 + . 3z3 
A user knows that the weight of the first key is .2 and that Smith's 
Max VOX is 68; thus the initial information is 
a L = .2 
X11 = 6 8 
To determine Jones's Max VOX, the user proceeds as follows. He 
poses the two queries q f x ^ x ^ x ^ ) and q(x21Jx12Jx13), to which 
the system will respond, respectively, 
qa = 407.6 
q2 = 406.2 
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Equation 4 can be used to solve for 
X21 = X11 - ( qr q2 ) / ai 
= 68 - 1.4/.2 
= 6 8 - 7 
= 61 
which is Smith's MAX VOX. 
This reasoning suggests that security, if it is possible at all, 
must require keeping all the weights secret. But a more complex argument, 
given in Appendix 1, shows that we can pose a set of queries which 
yield a set of equations in the unknowns a^. If these equations are 
linearly independent, we can solve for the â  and then use the known 
value of one data element to compromise the rest of the data base. In 
other words, knowing only one data element and none of the weights often 
suffices for a compromise. The exact statement of the result is: 
Compromising Weighted Sums. Suppose that x^ is known for some 
key p. With no more than k(k+l) queries it may be possible to 
determine k additional keys pl,...,pk. The 
remaining N-k-1 data elements can be deduced with an additional 
N-k-1 queries using the method of Equation 4. Thus full compro-
2 mise is possible within N+k -1 queries. 
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The technique will be illustrated in an example below. 
These arguments lead to the conclusion that security depends on 
denying the inquirer any initial information about the data base — for 
example, by restricting his access to records about which he knows nothing. 
In Appendix 2 we prove that such a restriction would work by showing the 
impossibility of solving any system of equations for any weight or any 
data element: 
Secure Weighted Sums. If the inquirer knows no data element, 
the data base is secure under his queries. 
Unfortunately there is no way to be absolutely sure that a user knows 
nothing about the records to which his access has been restricted. 
Even if such an idea were enforceable, the presence of other types of 
queries can invalidate this result. The unweighted-sum compromise of 
Dobkin et al, for example, requires no initial knowledge [DJL76]. 
The next subsection illustrates the method of compromising a data 
base using weighted sum queries when one data element is known. 
Example. 
Let y^ = x^j denote the Max VOX for runner i. Let k = 2 and suppose 
y^ = 68 is known. The data base implements the query 
q(z1,z2) = 2Zj + 3z2 
but the weights (a^a-) = (2,3) are unknown. Form three sets of two queries 
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q10 = q(y2,y3) = 290 qll a q(y3>y2) = 295 
q20 = q(yry3) = 304 q21 = q(y3,yx) = 316 
q30 = q(yry2) = 319 q32 = qCy2,yj) = 326 
the numbers show the system's responses. Let A = a.. + a_ and observe that 
10 + qil = A(y2+y3) = 585 
20 + q21 = A(y1+y3) = 620 = ^2 
31 + q31 = A(y1+y2) = 645 = 
whereupon 
A = Q j / C y ^ ) = Q2/C y^y 3) = ( y C y ^ ) 
This can be manipulated into two equations in unknowns y^ and y^: 
-Q2y2 - (QrQ 2^ 3 » -Q^i 
Q2y2 - Q3y3 = (Q-j-Q^ 
For the given numbers, 
-620 y2 - 35 y3 = -(585) (68) 
620 y2 - 645 y3 = (25)(68) 
It is easily verified that y2 = 61 and y3 = 56 is the solution. We may 
solve for a^ and a2 using the equations 
aly2 + a2y3 = q10 
alyl + a2y3 = q20 
To find any other yi we solve q(y^,yi) = 136 + 3y^ once the system's 
response is known. 
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4. PARTITIONED QUERIES 
We consider weighted-sum queries with the restriction that each weight 
â  is associated with a separate class Y^ of data elements, and that the 
key in a query's specification list must refer to the class Ŷ  . We denote 
the number of data elements in Y. by N., so that N = E. N.. The columns of 
J J J J 
the runner's data base are examples of classes. 
We observe first that the method of Equation 4 can be used to compromise 
all of class Y. if the weight a. and some element x of that class both are J 5 3 
known. In all, N̂  queries are required for this. If we know all the weights 
and one data element in each class, we can compromise the entire data base 
with N queries. 
Suppose that we know all k of the weights and data elements from only 
k-1 classes. We can determine an element from the unknown class (say Y^) 
with one query using the known elements from the other classes (say 
Zj, .. . ,z^_1,z;.+1,. . . ,zk) : 
(5) q(z1,...,zk) = a2Zi+'•'+akzk' 
After the system responds with the value of this query, ẑ  is the only 
unknown quantity in this equation. It follows that full compromise is 
possible with N+l queries when all weights are known and data elements 
from all but one class are known. 
Similarly, if we know one element from each class, and all but 
one of the weights, we can apply Equation 5 using the known z^,... 
the missing weight is the only unknown quantity. Full compromise is 
again possible with N+l queries. 
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The method illustrated in the previous section was able to effect a 
compromise when none of the weights was known and the entire data base was 
a single class. This method depends on permuting the same keys among dif-
ferent positions in the query specification lists. Partitioning the data 
bases prevents these permutations and makes compromise more difficult. 
In Appendix 3 we prove that 
If one knows all the weights, one data element from 
each of k-2 classes, and no data element from the 
other two classes, then full compromise of the k-2 
known classes is possible. The two unknown classes 
are secure. 
The proof shows that no system of equations constructed contains enough 
information to solve for data elements in the unknown classes. The proof 
of this result shows further that every unknown class is secure provided 
that at least two classes are unknown initially. 
These results show that keeping the weights secret is essential to 
security especially if users may know data elements from some of the 
classes. However, if other types of queries are possible in the same 
data base, compromise may be possible without prior knowledge. For example 
2 
DeMillo et al have shown that 0(k ) selection queries (median, maximum 
minimum, etc.) can determine an element from an unknown class [DDL76]; 
such queries can provide the initial information needed to compromise with 
partitioned queries. (See also [Scw77].) 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Our results have shown that the maximum tolerable information to 
prevent compromise using weighted-sum or partitioned-weighted-sum queries 
is quite low. Security under weighted-sum queries can be assured only if 
users have no prior knowledge of any data element; the weights must be 
kept secret. Security in partitioned data bases can be assured only if 
at least two of the weights or at least two of the classes are kept secret. 
It is not always possible to keep weights secret, and it may be impossible 
to enforce the restriction that the user knows no data element. 
When the inquirer has sufficient initial information for a compromise, 
his task is easy. At worst, he needs to pose one query for each unknown 
data element in the (class of the) data base which he is compromising, 
plus possibly a small additional but fixed number of queries. If the data 
base supports other types of queries such as selection queries, the user may 
be able to deduce unknown data elements with small cost, before using 
algorithms of this paper for a compromise. 
Compromise of statistical data bases is usually possible, and it is 
cheap. 
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APPENDIX 1: Compromising Linear Queries 
We wish to show that knowing one data element, say z^, may be sufficient 
to compromise a data base under linear queries. The compromise proceeds in 
three parts. FiTst, k(k+l) queries are used to derive k+1 equations whose 
solution yields k additional data elements z^,-••,z^+i• Then the k+1 known 
data elements are used to derive k more equations whose solution is the 
weights aj,...,ak. Finally, the method of Equation 4 is used to deduce 
the remaining N-(k+l) unknown data elements. Full compromise is achievable 
2 with N-(k+l)+k(k+l) = N+k -1 queries in all. 
Let Z = fz1,...,z. n) be a list of data elements for which z, is — ^ 1 k+17 1 
known. Let Z. be Z with z. deleted, and let Z.. denote the ith one-step — l — i ' —ij J ^ 
cyclic permutation of Z^. (Note that Z ^ = Ẑ j,*) Let q^j denote the 
response to the query q(Z^ .), where i = l,...,k+l and j = 0,...,k-l. Note 
that k(k+l) queries are needed to determine all the q^^. 
Each element of Z^ is permuted into each of the k positions by the 
queries qfZ^g),... jqfZ^ k_1!) • If S = z1+z2+. . . + then the sum of 
elements in Z^ is S-z^ and the sum of these permuted queries is 
k-1 k-1 
Qi = I qii = I a (S-z ) = ACS-z ) 
j=0 3 j=0 3 1 
where A = aj+.-.+a^- It follows that Q^^/(S-zi) = A = Qi + 1/ (S-z^). This 
gives a set of k equations in the k unknowns z2» • • •j z]c+i: 
s c v < W + W i - V i + i s 0 = 
17 
If these equations are linearly independent, their solution will yield 
the values of (If these equations are not linearly indepen-
dent, nothing can be concluded about the security of the data base, 
because another choice of z ^ , . . . m i g h t produce a solvable set of 
equations.) We can use the known values of Zj,...^ to invert the 
equations corresponding to the queries q(ZiQ),...,q(Zik) and find the 
unknown coefficients: 











l q k0 
Now the method of Equation 4 can be applied to find the remaining 
data elements. 
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APPENDIX 2: Secure Linear Queries 
We suppose that the user has no initial knowledge about any data 
element. Our objective is proving that it is impossible for him to find 
enough linearly independent equations to solve for any unknown data 
element or query weight. 
Consider any m queries among which appear the data elements 
Z = }. We assume m >_ k+s since we can always pose more queries 
without impairing our ability to compromise. We will apply the Implicit 
Function Theorem (IFT) [Gar68], which states that a set of functions 
q^,...jqm over variables Xj,...,x are mutually independent if the 





I ! ] 9x n 
m 
3x n J 
For our problem, the queries q ,...,qm depend on the n = k+s quantities 
and z^,...,zs- The matrix is 
b 
M = 
Z11 2lk , bll 
2 i *" ' 2 i i b -ml mk ml 
Is 
ms 
where z^ is the member of Z appearing in the jth position of the ith 
query, and 
a •, { a . 
o! 
if z.. = ẑ  1J t 
otherwise 
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Let r = rank(M). We observe that T < k+s because column k+p CP = l,...,s) 
can be written as a linear combination of the others: 
k s 
2 ajzij " 2 ztbit = bipzP (i = 1 " ' " m ) j=1 t=i 
Note that z. . = z^ if and only if b.^ = a., which implies that the nonzero ij t. it j 
terms in the second sum cancel all but b. z in the first. Since r < k+s, ip p 
det(M) = 0, which implies that some of q1,...,qm are redundant. 
Consider an rxr submatrix N of M formed by taking any r linearly 
independent rows, and any r linearly independent columns except column 
k+p. -Renumber the queries so that q^j-.->qr correspond to the TOWS of N. 
By construction det(N) ^ 0, but any determinant of r+1 rows and columns 
of M must be zero. The IFT shows that are mutually independent 
and that each query among • • - >^+5 c a n be expressed in terms of 
qx,.. .,qr [Gar68]. 
We will show that x^ is not a function of any of the queries 
q^,...,qr. To do this we treat x^ as a new function of the same quantities 
(â  or z^) on which q^,...,qr depend according to the matrix N; we add 







_ _ E 
It is not hard to see that det(N') = (-1) detCN) i* 0, which implies that 
Xp is not a function of any quantity on which q^,...,qr depend and, therefore) 
that Xp is not a function of any of q1,...,qi>. 
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APPENDIX 3: Secure Partitioned Queries 
We wish to show that if all weights are known but no element from 
at least two classes is known, then the unknown classes are secure. 
The classes from which we know at least one element are vulnerable to 
compromise via Equation 4. 
It is sufficient to prove security when exactly two classes are 
unknown since a procedure for compromising three or more unknown classes 
could also be used to compromise two unknown classes. Let Y^ and Y2 be 
the two unknown classes, and let t*ie elements of 
Yj and J^l'''''^2N t*ie elements of Y2< Because data from the known 
classes is functionally independent of data in the unknown classes, 
are irrelevant to compromising Y^ and Y2. Therefore we need 
only to prove that queries of the form 
q(Z:Lz2) = a i z i + a2z2 
cannot reveal any element of Y^ or Y,,. 
Suppose that queries q ^ j ^ a v e keen Posed for i = l,...,m, 
yielding responses q- ,... ,q . These queries can be represented by 
the matrix equation 
lll alNx I bll IN, 
I 








. r v i f z u " "u 
0, otherwise 
Now 
a2' i f Zi2 = ^2j 
* 0, otherwise 
; th let A^ represent the jtn column in the left part of the p by (Nj+^J 
coefficient matrix, and B̂  represent the j1-*1 coliimn of the right part. 
Note that 
N1 N2 
— 2 A. - — 2 B. = 0. 
al j=l 3 a2 j=l J 
This means that the columns are not independent and that the rank of the 
coefficient matrix is less than N^+N2 -- i.e., the system of equations 
cannot be solved for any of the N^+N^ unknowns. 
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